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RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
Russia, international law, and
the melting of the Arctic
The melting ice in the polar caps is one of humanity’s contemporary
ecological  anxieties.  Climate  change  scientists  have  suggested  that
there is a high likelihood that the Arctic sea ice cover will get thinner
and  continue  to  shrink.  Likewise,  the  Northern  Hemisphere  spring
snow cover is expected to decrease during the 21  century as global
mean surface  temperature  rises.  Are  the  current  international  legal
mechanisms sufficiently equipped to respond to such changes? How
will  this  affect  the  Arctic  States  and  their  claims  to  maritime  and
coastal boundaries? This post will briefly zoom in on one Arctic state,
the Russian Federation. The post argues that the Russian approach to
international  law  in  the  Arctic  and  the  current  and  potential
exploitation of natural resources, has been that of both strategy and
cooperation.
The economic perspective on this issue is primarily concerned with
the  climate-change-induced  possibilities  for  opening  up  alternative
and much shorter shipping routes during the summer months, such as
the  Northwest  Passage  and  the  Northern  Sea  Route.  The  openings
would benefit international trade, and make the oil and gas deposits
thought  to  lie  under  the  Arctic  seabed much easier  to  access.  The
Arctic littoral states – Denmark (Greenland), Canada, Norway and the
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United  States  – are  also  competing  to  prove  that  Arctic  territories
constitute  a  part  of  their  continental  shelf,   for  the  purpose  of
exploring and exploiting the soil and subsoil of maritime areas outside
their Exclusive Economic Zones. Other states, such as China, also have
interests  in  the region.  In  2013,  the Arctic  Council  decided at  their
meeting  in  Kiruna,  Sweden,  to  admit  six  non-Arctic  nations  as
observers,  including  China.  At  the  moment,  the  resolution  of  the
disputes in the Arctic depends on international law, as well as scientific
data and diplomatic strategies.
These activities seem to take place alongside the (re-opened) debate
among  some  legal  scholars  regarding  the  particularly  “Russian”
engagement with the international legal order.[1] For instance, in some
more recent commentary, Russia (re-)emerges as a ‘norm-maker’,  as
well  as  a  ‘semi-peripheral’  power.[2]  The  Russian  approach  to
international law in the Arctic has historically been that of cooperation
as  well  as  strategy.  While  the  2014  conflict  in  Ukraine  led  to  the
suspension of some forms of energy cooperation as expressed in the
EU-Russia  Energy  Dialogue,  energy  trade  and  a  convergence  of
commercial interests between energy companies, Russia, the EU and
its members has continued.[3] Despite the present tense relationship
with  the  Western  countries,  the  Russian  Federation  continues  to
participate in  the Arctic  Council.  It  sent  a  delegate to the biannual
meetings  of  the  Senior  Arctic  Officials  in  2014  and  2015  and
participated in the decision-making processes of the Council. Michael
Byers has argued that Russia-Western relations in the Arctic region
have been insulated, to some degree, from developments elsewhere.[4]
This is certainly not evident in all areas of state interests (e.g. security
and military,  vs.  oceans and fisheries)  or in relation to all  states.  In
contemporary international law, control over maritime spaces entitles
the  state  to  “ownership”  of  water  and  subsoil  resources  and,
consequently,  entails  economic,  territorial,  strategic,  political  and
military  supremacy.  However,  the  nature  of  the  issues  such  as
fisheries,  search  and  rescue,  continental  shelves,  or  navigation,
demands  cooperation.  The  migratory  patterns  of  fish,  or  the
consequences  of  climate  change,  take  place  independently  of
international  legal  standards,  as  well  as  the  strategic  interests  and
predictions  of  states.  For  our  contemporary  studies  on  the  role  of
Russia, international law, and the melting of the Arctic | Völkerre... http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/?p=8187&preview_id=8187&previ...
2 von 6 13.01.18, 18:27
international  law in relation to political,  geostrategic,  economic and
environmental changes and crises, this has great importance, as legal
scholarship increasingly identifies contemporary Russia as a state with
an exceptional approach to international law. However, this trajectory
was never unidirectional or consistent.
Furthermore,  the  Soviet  foreign  relations  at  UNCLOS,  especially
attempts at collaboration with the United States, present us with an
example of a complex combination of global and sovereign interests,
and pragmatic concerns. The ratification of UNCLOS in 1982 by four of
the  five  Arctic  Ocean  states  also  meant  that  they  committed
themselves to a science-based process for determining the outer limit
of  their  continental  shelves  where,  as  coastal  states,  they  have
exclusive rights over seabed resources.
Cooperative  efforts  are  evident  in  agreements  such  as  the  1920
Svalbard Treaty with Norway, or multinational cooperation on fisheries
management  in  the  Barents  Sea,  which  dates  to  1959  and  became
bilateral when the Soviet Union and Norway claimed 200-nautical mile
fishing  zones  in  1976.  The  two  countries  created  the  Norwegian-
Russian  Fisheries  Commission,  and  entered  into  a  ‘Grey  Zone
Agreement’  on  fisheries  management  in  the  area  where  their  new
maritime  claims  overlapped,  as  well  as  began  using  science-based
quotas. On September 9, 2010 Norway and Russia signed a treaty on
delimitating  the  maritime  boundary  between  the  two  states  in  the
Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The agreement divided a formerly
disputed area into two nearly equal parts.
This year, the Russian delegation has announced that it will file a claim
with the new UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS)  to  expand the  nation’s  continental  shelf  claim in  the  Arctic.
Russia  ratified  UNCLOS  on  March  12,  1997.  In  February  2016,  the
Russian  Minister  of  Natural  Resources  and  Environment,  Sergei
Donskoi presented Russia’s revised continental shelf claim in the Arctic
to the UN after more than 10 years of geological research. The Russian
application includes underwater territories with a total area of about
1.2 million square kilometers and including the Lomonosov Ridge, the
Mendeleyev  Elevation,  and  the  Chukchi  high  plain.  The  new
commission commenced its work in June, and among the 21 members
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are  experts  in  disciplines  of  geology,  geophysics,  hydrography  and
geodesy.
The recent 100th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution has sparked
numerous  academic  and  non-academic  events  worldwide,  which
commemorated and reflected on its legacy. However, such debates do
not  give  sufficient  focus  to  Russia’s  long-standing,  albeit  self-
interested  and  strategic  engagement  with  international  law,  and
therefore,  avoid the broader question of  the mutual  constitution of
international law and individual state interests. This point, in turn, is
relevant to our more pressing concerns in the Arctic, because of the
increasing  irrelevance  of  state  interests  in  the  matters  of  climate
change.
Interestingly, it was the Russian geologist and palaeontologist Alexei
Petrovich Pavlov (1854–1929) who first used the term “Anthropocene” in
1922.  The human law (including international  law)  is  part  of  human
activity, which, as Paul J. Crutzen argued in 1995, had driven the earth
into  a  new  geological  epoch,  which  he  then  termed  (even  if  not
originally) the Anthropocene. The theme of ecological anxiety in the
Arctic is thus related not only to the matter of individual state interests
–Russia, or any other state – and its positioning by self and others in
international law and politics, but also to how states and international
law govern science, technology, and the global society.
These two seemingly separate stories – of Russian strategic interests,
and Arctic melting ice – are connected in the following ways. First, the
public-private-international-transnational-state  nexus  of  political,
military, economic, and other interests are shaping the international
legal developments, regardless of their geographic, ideological, and/or
socio-cultural positioning. Second, there is a disconnect between the
debates  on “who owns the Arctic”,  and the climate change science,
although  the  physical  changes  in  the  Arctic  are  directly  affecting
current  individual  state  claims.  Russia,  for  example,  claims that  the
Lomonosov  Ridge  is  a  submarine  elevation  within  the  meaning  of
UNCLOS, such that the 2500 metre isobath rule would apply. However,
explorations  carried  out  to  date,  indicate  that  geologically,  the
Lomonosov Ridge is not a natural component of Russia’s continental
margin.  According  to  UNCLOS  Art.  76,  the  default  length  of  the
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continental shelf is a minimum of 200 nautical miles from the coastal
state’s baselines. UNCLOS grants the Arctic state on whose continental
shelf  they  are  located the exclusive  rights  to  exploit  any resources
potentially existing there. These resources would, in consequence, not
be subject to the rules applicable to the common heritage of mankind,
which are administered by the International Seabed Authority. Thus,
the environmental and ecology concerns are not the same as those of
individual  states  and  their  economic  or  political  and  strategic
interests,  but climate change is causing them; and international law
has yet to respond to both. In this regard, it is here argued, that it is
less significant whether the claim is made by Russia or another state,
than the actual distinction between natural science and politics.
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